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c. Managers analyze Financial Statements to capture a 
company's financial position for a given period. This allows 
users of financial information to analyze and compare the 
health of one company to another. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
d. I am satisfied at how my system is set up at this time. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
e.  Sometimes it happens that accountants make mistakes 
purposely, the only solution for this is termination. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Abstract 
Deposit insurance is an insurance system that guarantees bank deposits of people in case of 
bank failure or a run on the bank. The system is first introduced in 1933 for Turkey and taken 
its final form with regulations in 2004. Deposit insurance in Turkey is handled by Savings 
Deposit Fund Insurance and according to the latest regulations compensation limit covers a 
maximum of 50,000 TL per depositor per member institution. Deposit insurance system 
which is adopted in most countries has various advantages for both individuals and banks. 
However academic debates commonly focus on whether this system encourages banks to take 
excessive risk. In this context the purpose of this study is to analyze the link between deposit 
insurance and bank risk taking. For this purpose, a panel regression analysis is applied to the 
ratio of deposits under insurance to total deposits and basic risk measures of banks operating 
in Turkey during 2004-2010. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Banking sector is special with its nature of financing long term investments with relatively 
short term deposits. This feature makes banks vulnerable to various types of risks both from 
market and from themselves. One of the threats towards banking system is the sudden 
withdrawals of large amount of deposits which is known as bank runs. This brings the need of 
applying some regulatory techniques to maintain “safety and soundness” of banks. Deposit 
insurance system is used as a regulatory tool in most countries for many years. The aim of 
such a system is to provide banking sector’s stability preventing banks from being subject to 
runs. Carapella and DiGiorgio (2004:77) define this system as:  
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“…an instrument through which the banking system guarantees that funds deposited by the 
public in a bank are independent of solvency and liquidity conditions of the bank itself, so 
that depositors may be sure of being reimbursed at any time”. 
Deposit guarantees are designed to protect small and usually uninformed depositors (Silva, 
2008:28) from losses depending on bank defaults, while protecting banking system’s stability 
(Aydın, Başar, et al., 2006:246). Thus, it reduces the likelihood of bank panics and protects 
banks from facing the problem of excessive and unexpected deposit withdrawal (Şıklar: 
2004:243). 
Deposit insurance system has various advantages for both depositors and banks. However 
academic debates commonly focus on whether this system is a source of moral hazard which 
reduces incentives of depositors to monitor their banks while encourages banks to take 
excessive risks (Silva, 2008; Beck, 2008:8; Boyd, De Nicola, 2005:1330; Bartholdy, Boyle et 
al., 2003:701; Bossone, 2000). 
In Turkey, the system is first introduced in 1933 and taken its final form with regulations in 
2004. Deposit insurance in Turkey is handled by Savings Deposit Fund Insurance and 
according to the latest regulations compensation limit covers a maximum of 50,000 TL per 
depositor per member institution. From this point of view, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate whether the amount of insured deposits affects the risk taking incentives of 
individual banks. According to our knowledge, this is the first study which analysis the bank 
level effects of deposit insurance system in Turkey. Originality of the study also depends on 
the deposit insurance proxy variable used in the analysis.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 looks at the related literature. Section 
3 describes data and variables and Section 4 introduces the methodology used in our empirical 
analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Finally in Section 6 we conclude.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) tested the effect of deposit insurance on bank 
stability. Using the data of 61 countries during 1980-1997, the study found that explicit 
deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability. 
Ninimaki (2000) analyzed the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on banks’ risk 
taking when the riskiness of banks can not be observed by depositors. According to the 
results, if the bank is monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance 
has no effect on risk taking. But introduction of deposit insurance triggers risk taking if there 
is competition in deposit market. In a similar study, Wu and Chi (2006) aimed to find out the 
relationship between competition and risk taking. They found that this relationship depends 
on the interactions of market structure between loan and deposit markets, deposit insurance 
and depositors’ risk aversion. Focusing on the effects of deposit insurance, the results suggest 
that with full deposit insurance coverage an increase in competition for deposit will trigger 
moral hazard problem while an inverse impact occurs under competition for loan. If the 
deposit insurance system is not introduced, then the risk taking behaviors of banks depend on 
depositor’s risk internalization. 
Bartholdy, Boyle et al. (2003) used data from 13 countries to investigate the relationship 
between deposit insurance and deposit risk premiums. Results suggest that insured deposits 
have a lower risk premium compared to the uninsured deposits. Another result of the study is 
that relationship between the risk premium and the maximum dollar value of insurance 
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coverage is non-linear that means moral hazard incentives are recognized and priced by 
investors.  
Gropp and Vesala (2004) investigated the impact of deposit insurance on EU banks’ risk 
taking during 1990s. The results suggest that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance 
system may significantly reduce risk taking. The authors also found some evidence that 
explicit deposit insurance might be a useful way to limit the safety net, increase market 
monitoring of banks and reduce moral hazard. 
Leaven and Levine (2008) assessed the relationships among risk taking of banks, their 
ownership structures and national bank regulations including deposit insurance system. Their 
results suggest that the impact of deposit insurance on banks’ risk taking varies depending on 
the ownership structure of banks. If the bank is widely-held, deposit insurance has not have a 
significant impact on risk taking. On the other hand if bank has a majority owner, bank risk 
increases significantly with an increase in deposit insurance.  
Silva (2008) has introduced deposit insurance in a model of information based bank runs. 
Results show that the net effect of deposit insurance on the equilibrium demand deposit 
contract is to raise its value and also the risk of runs. So deposit insurance induces moral 
hazard. 
Ioannidou and Penas (2010) analyzed the effect of deposit insurance on the risk taking 
behavior of banks. Using the case of Bolivia, the authors compared the risk taking behavior of 
banks before and after the introduction of deposit insurance system in December 2001. Their 
main findings indicate that the introduction of deposit insurance system led to an increase in 
the probability of a bank originating a subprime loan. The results also suggest that banks do 
not increase collateral requirements or decrease loan maturity to compensate for the extra risk. 
Cross sectional analysis confirm the consequence that banks take more risk after the deposit 
insurance system is introduced.  
Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) analyzed whether deposit insurance systems and ownership 
structures of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks’ risk taking. They found 
that total effect of explicit deposit insurance coverage on risk taking is shown as a U-shaped 
curve. This indicates that risk taking is minimized at a positive and partial insurance coverage 
level where market discipline is at its strongest.  
Ng, Lim et al. (2010) searched the relation between explicit deposit insurance and risk taking 
of banks in Malaysia during 2004-2007. The authors found that explicit deposit insurance had 
different effects on various risk factors. After the introduction of deposit insurance scheme, 
only two risks, interest rate risk and risk-weighted capital ratio deteriorated. Deposit rate, 
credit risk, liquidity risk and core capital ratio were not significantly changed for the post-
introduction period.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
To analyze the effects of deposit insurance on banks’ risk taking, we used annual bank level 
data of 27 banks continually operated in Turkey during 2004-2010 (from the beginning of 
implementation of the latest deposit insurance regulation to the present). Following Ng, Lim, 
et al. (2010), we aimed to understand the effects of the insured deposits/total deposits ratio (as 
the proxy of explicit deposit insurance) on banks’ risk taking and activities. For investigating 
banks’ risk taking behaviors, following variables are selected: 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variables Acronyms Definition 
Deposit insurance DI Insured deposits/total deposits 
Credit Risk NPL Non-performing loans/total loans 
Liquidity Risk LIQ Liquid assets/short term liabilities 
Interest Rate Risk Exposure INT Interest rate sensitivity of balance sheet and 
off-balance sheet position/total capital
*
 
Capital Adequacy Ratio CAR Capital as a fraction of risk-weighted assets 
 
4. Methodology 
Following the existing literature, the main hypothesis of this study is that banks tend to take 
more excessive risks if their ratio of insured deposits to total deposits is higher. In order to 
investigate this assumption, we applied regression analysis to our panel data set of 189 
observations including 27 banks and 7 years. Effects of insured-deposit-rates on several risk 
factors are analyzed separately. So our key independed variable is deposit insurance (DI). An 
Ordinary Least Squares technique is used; because it is suitable to use for the econometrics of 
panel data because of the double individual dimensions of the data (Batisse, 2001). Random 
effects technique is selected in estimations according to the data structure. 
Definitely, insured-deposits-rate is not the only variable determining the risk levels of banks; 
but the others wouldn’t be considered in the context of this study. In our empirical analysis, 
we just add three control variables to improve the explanatory power of DI. These variables 
are; 
 Crises Dummy: The global financial crisis quite likely has affected the level of risk 
variables. The crisis has begun in 2007 but its effects are experienced in Turkey 
especially in 2009. We can understand this looking at the negative growth rates of the 
economic indicators (mainly Gross Domestic Product-GDP growth) in 2009. So the 
variable takes “1” for 2009 and “0” for other years. 
 Real GDP: Gross Domestic Product is expected to have an impact on the risk levels of 
banks affecting their borrowers’ solvency as well as risk appetite of banks. Data is 
obtained from www.dpt.gov.tr. 
 Inflation: Proxied by producer price index. Basic impact of inflation is expected to be 
on interest rates. Inflation also increases the uncertainty of the future for borrowers, 
depositors and for banks. So the variable is expected to have a positive effect on risk 
levels. Data is obtained from www.dpt.gov.tr. 
                                                          
* Ratio of the difference between the liabilities subject to repricing within one year and the assets subject to 
repricing within one year plus off-balance sheet position to total capital 
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5. Empirical Results 
Applying OLS technique to our panel data set, we have found that the effect of deposit 
insurance is significant only for two variables. These variables are NPL (non performing loan 
ratio) and LIQ (liquidity ratio). The directions of these effects are consistent with literature 
and with our expectations.  
Results suggest that the amount of insured deposits over total deposits has a positive and 
significant effect on NPL supporting the “moral hazard” argument. According to this 
argument, deposit insurance makes banks less sensitive in screening and monitoring of loans 
and this attitude increases the level of NPL. 
Another significant effect of DI is on LIQ and the direction of this effect is negative as 
expected. This result suggests that when the insured deposit rate is higher, i.e. bank’s 
responsibility is undertaken by government, bank’s incentive to invest in liquid assets in order 
to meet its obligation is destroyed.  
Interest rate sensitivity (INT) is affected positively by DI. It means that banks become less 
careful in matching assets and liabilities according to the time remaining to repricing. But this 
effect is not statistically significant. 
Deposit insurance affects Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) negatively. Banks consider deposit 
insurance as compensation towards their potential losses but if their obligations are insured by 
the government, they don’t consider equity necessary. However, this effect is not statistically 
significant. 
In determination of LOAN variable, DI gets negative coefficient but it is not significant. In 
the equation of DEP, DI gets positive coefficient but this effect is insignificant either.  
 
Table 2- Empirical Results 
Depended Variable Coefficient of DI Probability R
2
 
NPL 0.090385 0.0940* 0.019856 
LIQ -0.303803    0.0454** 0.094406 
INT 0.003329 0.4712 0.021026 
CAR -0.081813 0.2556 0.075056 
LOAN -0.904939 0.5806 0.024697 
DEP 0.056876 0.2336 0.021429 
* Significant at %10 significance level 
* Significant at %5 significance level 
6. Conclusion 
Deposit insurance is a system which guarantees repayments of deposits to depositors and in 
this way protects financial system’s stability preventing bank runs. However, there is a 
common suspicion in academic literature on whether this system leads banks to behave less 
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prudently and encourages them to take excessive risks. This question is widely investigated in 
academic researches and common view is that the system is a source of moral hazard.  
In Turkey, deposit insurance system is being held for many years under various politic 
attitudes. For example during 1990s, deposit insurance covered 100% of deposits in each 
bank. Since 2004, coverage limit is discounted to 50,000 TL for each depositor in each bank. 
In this context, the aim of this study is to determine what kind of results occurs at bank level 
by implementing this new system. To analyze the possible effects of deposit insurance 
system, we applied Ordinary Least Squares method to our bank level data including a panel of 
27 banks operated in Turkey during 2004-2010. The key independed variable of this study is 
the amount of insured deposits over total deposits (DI). The aim of the study is to determine 
the effects of DI on various kinds of risk factors and activities. We considered three risk 
factors which are credit risk (NPL), interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Other depended 
variable are Capital Adequacy standard ratio (CAR), loans/deposits ratio (LOAN) and 
deposits/total assets ratio (DEP). Supporting the moral hazard argument, results suggest that 
deposit insurance raises credit risk which is proxied by NPL ratio. Insured deposit rate also 
has a deteriorating effect on banks’ liquidity. On the other hand, the variable isn’t found 
related with interest rate risk, capital ratio, loan ratio and deposits ratio.  
Basing on these findings, we suggest that regulatory institutions should focus on the moral 
hazard of banks to eliminate the adverse effects of the system. In order to explore whether the 
impact of deposit insurance on banks changed after the latest regulation, a further analysis is 
necessary. 
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Abstract 
In this paper, complicated dynamical behavior of a finance system is investigated. The change 
in behavior of finance system from stable behavior to chaotic behavior is shown with varying 
some system parameters. In addition, chaotic finance system with passive control is 
considered and the stability of the controlled system is investigated. In order to control the 
chaos in finance system, the controller is designed based on passive control technique. 
Designed controller is applied to the chaotic finance system for stabilization of system. After 
controller is added to the system, the change in behavior of finance system from chaotic 
behavior to stable behavior is shown with passive control. 
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